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Executive Summary

Plan for the Redevelopment of Headingley Correctional Institution

Manitoba
Justice
Adult Corrections

1989

Headingley Correctional Institution is an aging and deteriorating facility. As such, it presents numerous problems.

SAFETY, SECURITY AND PROGRAMMING

An important and immediate set of problems for the facility are the extensive defects it has with regard to fire protection specifically and other issues of health and safety generally. To comply with directions from the Office of the Fire Commissioner and as a consequence of other safety reviews, a number of capital projects have been identified as essential to bring Headingley within fire codes and safety requirements. These projects are outlined in the report. The scope of work is extensive and estimated costs of between $4 million to $5 million are involved. Unfortunately, this represents only a portion of the liability the current facility represents.

From a security point of view, the facility has a poor and permeable perimeter, an antiquated locking system and marginal capabilities in terms of inmate movement control or group containment. The bars in the cells are inadequate to the extent that a serrated butter knife can saw through them in short order. The configuration of the building and its long corridors makes direct supervision of inmates by staff extremely difficult. Building layout, access to services and inmate traffic patterns make it extremely problematic to manage inmates according to different security levels and requirements. Establishing a safe protective custody area in the event of a riot is seriously compromised by the limitations of the facility. Program space at Headingley has been chronically deficient. This is partly attributable to the fact that Headingley has been overcrowded for many years. All inmate space was consumed for beds. Secondly, the building never originally had program space designed into it. Headingley was designed in the 1920's, a very different correctional era.

LIVING AND WORKING CONDITIONS

Inmate living conditions are among the worst in the province. The cell blocks offer little privacy and the dormitories none at all. Extensive deterioration of the ceilings and walls contribute to a generally demoralizing effect. The lack of adequate toilet and shower facilities have been persistent problems.

All of the above factors contribute to a demoralizing work environment for correctional staff. There is a general recognition and frustration that the existing facility militates against safety, security and effective programming.

In its public report to the Minister of Community Services and Corrections in 1983, the Review Committee on Adult Corrections (Garson Committee) noted:

> "The review Committee's visit to Headingley Correctional Institution convinced them that the core of the main institution is quite inadequate to carry out any kind of humane program." (pg. 9)

Clearly, a comprehensive solution is required for this daunting array of difficulties.

REDEVELOPMENT PLAN

This report will reveal a plan to redevelop Headingley in the most cost effective manner possible while achieving maximum programming objectives.

Fundamentally, the redevelopment plan foresees a phased reduction in the use of Headingley's existing Main Building for inmate housing. A series of small, satellite living units would be established around the Headingley complex but in proximity to the Main Building. The Main Building would gradually adopt

the role of a central services core. Since medium security inmates would be housed outside the walls of the Main Building, a new perimeter security fence would be installed to enclose the medium security units.

COST-BENEFIT CONSIDERATIONS

From a cost viewpoint, several major advantages accrue from this approach. The redevelopment plan conserves the newer wings of the main institution for central services such as food preparation, visiting, stores, laundry, administration and the gymnasium. Accordingly, the new inmate housing units do not have to incorporate these features into their design and significant construction savings are realized. No land acquisition is required since Crown land will be used. Duplication of services is avoided since the new units will share the central services core and one institutional administration.

Also desirable is the plan's capital flexibility. The construction of small units in a phased approach does not require the amount of capital necessary in any given year that would be required to build a large replacement institution. Similarly, the phased approach permits construction capital to be spread over several years and even interrupted without jeopardizing the total plan.

The redevelopment plan will eliminate a host of operational and program problems associated with the ills of the existing facility. Of equal importance are the many program and operational opportunities which will become available. These aspects and benefits are outlined in detail in the enclosed report.

PLAN FOR THE REDEVELOPMENT

OF

HEADINGLEY CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION

1989

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SECTION ONE

INTRODUCTION

A. Alternatives Considered

B. Campus Plan Overview

I. INTRODUCTION

Headingley Correctional Institution is an aging and deteriorating facility. As such, it presents numerous problems.

An important and immediate set of problems for the facility are the numerous defects it has with regards to fire protection specifically, and other issues of health and safety generally. To comply with directions from the Office of the Fire Commissioner and in view of recent health and safety reviews, a number of projects have been identified as necessary to bring Headingley within fire codes and safety requirements. Appendix "I" lists these projects. As will be noted, the scope of work is extensive and far from completed. The estimated costs of between $4 million to $5 million are significant but represent only a portion of the potential financial liability the current facility represents.

Necessary as all of this work is to the safety of inmates and staff, these projects and these dollars will do nothing to actually make Headingley a better or more effective correctional operation.

From a security point of view, the facility has a poor and permeable perimeter, an antiquated locking system and marginal capabilities in terms of inmate movement control or group containment. The bars in the cells are inadequate to the extent that a serrated butter knife can saw through them in short order. The configuration of the building and its long corridors makes direct supervision of inmates by staff extremely difficult. Building layout, access to services and inmate traffic patterns are counter productive to efforts which would make meaningful differentiations between security levels. Establishing a safe protective custody area in the event of a riot is seriously compromised by the limitations of the facility. Program space at Headingley has been chronically deficient. This is partly attributable to the fact that Headingley has been overcrowded for many years. All inmate space was consumed for beds. Secondly, the building never originally had program space designed into it. Headingley was designed in the 1920's, a very different correctional era.

Inmate living conditions are among the worst in the province. The cellblocks offer little privacy and the dormitories none at all. Extensive deterioration of the ceilings and walls contribute to a generally demoralizing effect. The lack of adequate toilet and shower facilities have been persistent problems.

All of the above factors contribute to a negative work environment for correctional staff and this is a source of morale problems. There is a general recognition and frustration that the existing facility militates against safety, security and effective programming.

In its public report to the Minister in September, 1983 the Review Committee on Adult Corrections (Garson Report) noted:

> "The Review Committee's visit to Headingley Correctional Institution convinced them that the core of the main institution is quite inadequate to carry out any kind of humane program" (page 9).

Clearly, a comprehensive solution needs to be found for this daunting array of difficulties. This redevelopment plan will describe an effective means of resolving Headingley's facility problems.

A. Alternatives Considered

Prior to proceeding with a description of the preferred option it is important to identify why some other options were not selected.

One option considered would involve construction of a new main building at Headingley. A new main building would integrate inmate housing, program space, services and administration within contemporary correctional philosophy. While this option would resolve the existing facility problems described earlier, there are several major difficulties with it.

The first involves cost. A major facility of this size would cost at least as much as the new Provincial Remand Centre and probably significantly more given the program space needs of a "sentenced" institution. At least $25 million to $30 million would be involved.

Another difficulty with this option is potential waste. The current Kitchen, Dining and Visiting wing was built in the early 1970's and is in good condition. The Recreation and Medical wings are also of recent vintage and are in good condition. It would be wasteful to demolish these wings but unavoidable if the option of a new major replacement facility were to be selected.

A second option considered would involve the construction of a network of smaller facilities around Winnipeg with perhaps one unit in Winnipeg. From a correctional programming viewpoint this is a superior option since smaller unit operations are preferable to larger ones for a host of reasons. As attractive as this option is from a program standpoint it presents a number of its own inherent problems.

Again, cost becomes a consideration. A series of smaller independent facilities may cost as much as the major facility option when building and land acquisition costs were totalled. Problematic also is the matter of

duplication. Each of the units would have to have its own service facilities such as kitchens and laundries. Some staffing duplications would result in terms of administration and supervision. In terms of operations, this option might be more expensive than the major facility option.

There is, of course, the "do nothing" option. Unfortunately, this is not a sensible alternative. Leaving things as is at Headingley commits the Government to $4 million - $5 million worth of short-term expenditures simply to mitigate the effects of a fire and to add 8 beds for an infectious disease control unit. Still remaining is the liability of a sixty year old building in a deteriorated state. Significant structural repairs will be necessary if long-term occupancy is contemplated. The plumbing and electrical systems of the inmate housing wings are aged and will require upgrading. Even simple improvements to this facility are prone to be inordinately expensive. For example, a 1988 Corrections request for a cost-estimate to provide six shower stalls in a Headingley inmate location produced a projected cost of $76,500.00!

On top of these factors is the grim reality that the existing facility layout is totally inadequate from a security, operational and program context. "Doing nothing" commits the Government to throwing good money after bad in a counter-productive facility. It leaves Manitoba as the only jurisdiction in western Canada to preserve a Depression era "bighouse". Stony Mountain, the only comparable Federal facility to Headingley in Manitoba in terms of size and approximate age, has announced a construction schedule for major redevelopment of its complex into smaller, decentralized units.

Corrections is recommending that a more effective alternative be considered. This report will reveal a plan to redevelop Headingley in the most cost-effective manner possible while achieving maximum programming objectives. The facility planning portion of the plan has been coined the "CAMPUS PLAN".

B. Campus Plan Overview

The Campus Plan foresees a phased reduction in the use of Headingley's existing Main Building for inmate housing. In place of the Main Building's housing core, new satellite living units would be established around the Headingley complex but in proximity to the Main Building. These new buildings would become the major housing units for the institution while the Main Building gradually adopts the role of a central services core. Since medium - security inmates would be housed outside the walls of the Main Building, a new perimeter security fence would be installed to enclose the medium-security units. (Appendix II depicts the existing Headingley complex).

From a cost viewpoint, several major advantages accrue from this approach. First, costs are reduced to a bare minimum. The Campus Plan conserves the newer wings of the main institution for central services such as food preparation, visiting, stores, laundry, administration and the gymnasium. Accordingly, the new inmate housing units do not have to incorporate these services into their design and significant construction savings are thus realized. No land acquisition is involved since Crown land will be used. The duplication of services is avoided since the new units will share the central services core and one institutional administration. This will, in turn, avoid the high operating costs which could have been problematic in a decentralized concept.

A desirable feature of the Campus Plan concerns its financial flexibility during implementation. The construction of smaller units in a phased approach does not require the amount of capital necessary in any given fiscal year that would be required to build a large institution. Similarly, the phased approach permits the construction capital to be spread over several years and even interrupted without jeopardizing the total plan.

The Campus Plan will eliminate a host of operational and program problems for Headingley, many associated with the ills of the existing Main Building. Of equal importance are the many program and operational

opportunities which will become available. The benefits of small, differentiated facilities in terms of more effective security and programs are widely acknowledged. The Campus Plan permits: flexibility in program design and delivery; effective separations of inmate groups; an integrated operational and staffing approach; direct supervision of inmates; superior utilization of the Headingley grounds in terms of inmate employment and industry. These aspects and benefits will be outlined in detail in the remainder of this report.

It is worthwhile to note that the "campus" concept in varying forms has been used by a number of correctional jurisdictions recently to deal with their problems of aging "big house" institutions. For example, the new Fort Saskatchewan facility outside Edmonton is built on this concept and totally replaces the inadequate former facility. Very recently, Regina Correctional Centre has campussed its complex through the addition of three new living units. Saskatchewan has used the same approach in Saskatoon as well. British Columbia will be proceeding very shortly with replacement of the Lower Mainland (Oakalla) institution. British Columbia has a corporate strategy of building smaller, decentralized institutions rather than large institutions.

SECTION TWO

THE HEADINGLEY INMATE POPULATION

A. Minimum Security Group
B. Protective Custody Group
C. Sex Offender Group
D. Psychiatric/Forensic Group
E. Medical/Isolation Group
F. Administrative Segregation Group
G. Punitive Segregation Group
H. General Population Group
I. Inmate Sub-Population Summary

II. THE HEADINGLEY INMATE POPULATION(s)

Essential to the understanding of correctional operations is a grasp of the inmate populations to which programs and operations are targeted. It is the characteristics of the inmates which define needs and constraints within a correctional institution in the broadest sense. Accordingly, prior to moving on to a description of Headingley's programs, operations and organization under the Campus Plan, a brief discussion of the client group is in order.

Appendix III provides a description of projected inmate population levels in the near future together with certain qualitative aspects which are important from the physical planning viewpoint. Summarizing the analysis in that Appendix briefly, Headingley will be a facility with approximately 300 inmates within the decade. There will be two separate major populations. One will be a minimum security group of about 60 inmates, most of whom will be serving very short sentences. There will be a relatively rapid turnover in this population. The other population at Headingley will be a medium-security group of about 240 inmates. There will be several quite different sub-populations within this latter group. The length of sentence will tend to be in excess of four months.

In very broad terms, inmates will tend to be young (18-29) but there appears to be evidence that the population is "aging" somewhat. Inmates tend to have partial high school educations. The education level of inmates has been increasing over the past five years. Approximately 60% of the inmates are white and 40% of native origin.

In terms of programming and inmate management there are several specific sub-populations to consider.

A. Minimum Security Group

The current projection calls for a population of approximately 60 minimum-security inmates at Headingley. This figure is quite sensitive,

however, to legislation and judicial trends which are difficult to accurately predict and assess in the long-term. Certain types of sentencing trends could increase this figure by 50% on a sustained basis. Accordingly, it is prudent to size the minimum-security unit in such a fashion that conversion to double-bunking in rooms can occur.

Minimum-security inmates will tend to be of two varieties. The first group will consist of first or infrequent offenders who are being incarcerated for short "impact" sentences. Their offence profile will tend to relate to property crimes or driving while impaired or suspended. The second, smaller group will consist of inmates who have "cascaded" to this unit from one of the medium-security units due to successful completion of an individual program plan and after a security clearance review. These inmates will be in the latter portion of longer sentences for more serious crime. They will be in the preparation stage for release. Neither group would be regarded as security risks and are generally not management problems. They will tend to be cooperative and non-aggressive with staff or each other. A significant portion of this population may be eligible for early release for treatment or employment purposes.

It is important for security and program reasons that this population not mix with the medium-security populations.

B. Protective Custody Group

Inmates are placed in protective custody (P.C.) for their own protection from the "regular" population. The five most common factors leading to P.C. status for an individual are: a sex-related offence; personal conflicts; identification as an informer; personality/psychological problems; sexual problems. At Headingley, the offence-related P.C. designations are most common. For the purposes of program planning, the sex offender group will be differentiated from the remainder of the P.C's in terms of program needs.

Without the sex offender element, it is estimated that 10 bed spaces would be required for P.C. cases. If placed apart from the sex offenders these inmates would require separate sub-unit housing in a medium-security unit. Placed with the sex offenders, they could reside in the same sub-units.

Inmates in protective custody are not being punished and should not be denied access to programs available to the regular population. The intent is to provide, to the greatest extent possible, a full range of programs while at the same time maintaining protective isolation of this group.

Protective custody inmates can consist of new or experienced offenders. Their sentence lengths and offence profiles can vary widely. Some may be in the preparation stage for release and may be eligible for early release. Others may be regarded as security risks. P.C. inmates are generally cooperative although the instances of aggressive behaviour with one another or staff will exceed that of the minimum-security group.

C. Sex Offender Group

Sex offenders are identified as a distinct population for several reasons. First, their numbers have become significant within the overall population. Although there are wide fluctuations in their numbers, Headingley generally has between 25 - 40 offenders at any given time. In the context of the Campus Plan, this group would consume between 75% to 100% of a medium-security unit. Secondly, they present unique needs in terms of treatment and programs directed at them and the nature of their offences. Thirdly, while they require the same protection as P.C. inmates and isolation from the regular population, they are distinct from the P.C.'s in terms of unique program needs.

The offence profile of this group will tend to be of two varieties. One group will have committed sexual assault offences involving individuals

other than their families. The second group will have committed sexual assault offences with individuals of their family. The individuals can range from first or infrequent offenders to experienced criminals. Because this group needs to be, of necessity for safety reasons, housed together they will be in the full range of serving sentences, i.e.: some will be commencing sentence; some in the mid-stage; and some in preparation for release. The sentence length is generally significant and appears to be increasing over time. The types of offences involved, length of sentence and the admixture of those commencing and completing sentences place this group in the medium-security context. It is important to note, however, that some of the individuals in this group may be eligible for day-releases or early release for the purposes of treatment or employment.

These inmates tend to be cooperative and non-aggressive with staff or one another.

D. Psychiatric/Forensic Group

This categorization encompasses a broad range of disorders and includes mental illness and mental handicap. In general terms, the nature of the disorder causes the inmate to have great difficulty in functioning within regular population. Some of these inmates are unpredictable and occasionally can be extremely aggressive. Some individuals are naive and docile, becoming easy victims of predators and manipulators within the regular population. Some individuals have manageable disorders but require regular follow-up in terms of monitoring behaviour and medications. A portion of these offenders are experiencing acute episodes which require treatment or temporary isolation but can then be returned to regular population. Other individuals have chronic disorders and require extensive or permanent separation.

Numbers of inmates within the above descriptions can range from 25 - 30 and is on the increase. They would occupy 50% - 75% of a medium-security unit.

Offence profiles vary widely and can range from petty property offences to murder. Individuals can range from submissive victims to unpredictable aggressors. Sentence lengths have an equally broad range. Up to half a dozen of these inmates are generally serving indefinite sentences (L.G.W. warrant) for murder. Some inmates would be permanent residents of the Psychiatric sub-units. Others would stay temporarily and return to the regular medium-security population or to the minimum-security unit.

Program needs of this group are diverse and extensive and they require access to specialized personnel. There is a functional relationship to Medical resources. Specialized diagnostic resources are required. Sophisticated case management is required. Separate occupational and recreational space is desirable.

E. Medical/Isolation Group

This inmate group is comprised of individuals who are ill, injured or infectious/contagious and cannot reside with the regular population. Current projections call for approximately 20 bedspaces in the medical/isolation sub-units. In the context of the Campus Plan this group would consume about half of a medium-security unit.

These individuals can originate from any security, program or separation category. Length of stay in the unit is related to medical condition and can vary from days to months. Due to the variety of inmates who can be housed in this area, a medium-security designation is required. Inmates having or suspected of having an infectious/contagious disease require physical isolation from the remainder of the inmates in the medical unit. Eight to ten beds may be required for this purpose.

Most inmates in the medical unit will tend to be transfers from other units on a temporary basis. Isolation inmates tend to be identified at Intake and experience lengthier, or permanent, housing in the medical unit. Needs will be basically of the physical and medical nature. For convalescent

inmates, some case management will be required but program and work participation will usually be suspended pending return to their units. Isolation inmates will require active case management and efforts will be made to offer access to programs available to the regular population.

This unit will have an essential functional relationship to medical resources and medical personnel. Facilities in the medical unit must be wheelchair accessible and handicapped fixtures are required.

Inmates in the medical/isolation areas tend to be cooperative and non-aggressive with staff or one another.

F. Administrative Segregation Group

Administrative segregation is used to separate incompatible inmates from others and to isolate individuals who may be identified as security risks or as a danger to themselves or others. Administrative segregation will also temporarily house inmates awaiting a hearing on charges arising from disciplinary or security incidents in the institution. With the exception of those awaiting a hearing on disciplinary charges, the minimum length of stay for an inmate will be 30 days in which time a review will be conducted to determine whether he can be returned to a regular population unit.

It is estimated that 10-20 bedspaces will be required for administrative segregation inmates in the medium/maximum-security unit. These inmates would be considered maximum-security.

Administrative segregation inmates tend to be aggressive, manipulative and uncooperative. Some may be dangerous to staff or other inmates. Physical security, procedures and case management will take into account these elements. The range of programming possible with these inmates is more limited than in a regular population unit for reasons of practicality and also inclination of the inmates. Separate recreational space of a very secure nature is required.

The Administrative Segregation unit should be able to physically double as a Disassociation/Punitive Segregation unit if the need arises.

G. Punitive Segregation Group

Punitive segregation (Disassociation) is intended as a disciplinary measure. Separation and confinement of an individual are the main components of the disassociation environment and security considerations occupy a primary role in the unit. Occasionally, the disassociation unit may hold an inmate for a short period of time to restrain behaviour during a violent "acting-out" episode. The period of time of such placement is limited to that necessary to "cool-off" the individual (usually a period of several hours to a day).

Inmates are placed in disassociation for fixed periods of time as a result of a direction from the institution's Disciplinary Board or, in isolated cases, on the direction of a supervisory staff member where immediate control of an aggressive and violent individual is required. The period of stay in the punitive segregation unit will usually be several days and may involve a few weeks.

It is estimated that 10 bedspaces will be required for punitive segregation inmates in the medium/maximum-security unit. These inmates would be considered maximum-security for the duration of their stay in the punitive segregation unit.

Punitive segregation inmates tend to be aggressive, manipulative and un-cooperative. A recent episode of violence to staff or other inmates may be involved. They will be recently guilty of a serious incident of institutional misconduct. Some may be dangerous to staff or other inmates. Physical security and procedures will take these elements into account. Programs are not conducted in this unit. Separate recreational space of a very secure nature is required. Punitive segregation inmates will generally return to

their former units upon completion of the disciplinary period although the more aggressive and recalcitrant individuals may be subsequently placed in the administrative segregation unit.

H. General Population Group

General population inmates will comprise all individuals identified as medium-security inmates (see Appendix IV for definitions) but not requiring special housing or separations as identified in the previous descriptions of sub-populations.

It is estimated that 80 bedspaces will be required to accommodate this population.

The offence profile of this group will be diverse but will tend toward property or assaultive behaviour of a serious nature. Many individuals will be experienced inmates. A number will be considered security risks due to a demonstrated propensity for escape attempts in unsecured surroundings. Length of sentence may vary widely but will tend to be concentrated toward significant periods of incarceration. Individuals approaching the latter portion of sentence may be identified as suitable for minimum-security placement and would be "cascaded" to that unit accordingly. Day release (DTA's) would not occur from these units.

Inmate behaviour will be diverse in this group, ranging from co-operative to aggressive. Compared to the minimum-security or protective custody populations, regular population will have a significantly higher incidence of un-cooperative or aggressive individuals.

Program needs will be extensive and varied for this population. A viable occupational/work element is needed for the inmates who are not actively involved in daily treatment programs. Active and inactive recreational opportunities are required.

Inmate Sub-Population Summary

Sub-Population	Estimated Volume	Security Rating
Minimum Security	60 - 90*	Minimum
Protective Custody	10	Minimum/Medium
Sex Offenders	25 - 40	Minimum/Medium
General Population	80	Medium
Psychiatric/Forensic	25 - 30	Medium/Maximum
Medical/Isolation	20	Minimum/Medium/Maximum
Administrative/Segregation	10 - 20	Maximum
Punitive Segregation	10	Maximum
	240 - 300**	

* Not included in minimum-security estimates are inmates sentenced to intermittent sentences. Divisional planning is looking toward a non-institutional alternative for this group. Electronic-monitoring or "house arrest" options are being considered. If these alternatives are not implemented, a residential trailer for up to 40 inmates should be situated adjacent to the minimum-security unit. This unit would be used on weekends for intermittent inmates.

** Total bedspace estimate does not include Intake beds or intermittent sentence population.

SECTION THREE

PHYSICAL COMPONENTS OF THE CAMPUS PLAN

A. The Main Building
B. The Minimum Security Unit
C. The Medium Security Units
D. The Medium/Maximum Security Unit
E. Other Buildings and Space
F. The Perimeter Security Fence
G. Summary of Building Requirements

III. PHYSICAL COMPONENTS OF THE CAMPUS PLAN

The central concept of the Campus Plan is that the inmate housing function will be handled by a series of specialized living units within the Headingley complex. Central administration and support services will be provided by the newer sections of the Main Building. Secure living units will be contained within a perimeter fence along with the services core. A minimum security unit would be outside the perimeter fence.

A. The Main Building

As the new housing units are built and brought into operation, the Main Building will transfer inmates to the new units. At the conclusion of the building stage the Main Building will house no inmates on any floor of the old north and south wings.

Upon vacating the north wing dormitories these spaces will be converted to group program spaces on at least an interim, and possibly indefinite, basis. Functions such as the education program and group counselling will take place in these program spaces. Upon vacating the south wing cell blocks, these spaces will be mothballed and the area closed.

The newer wings of the institution include the Kitchen, Dining/Visiting Room, Visitors' reception, Interview spaces, Institutional storage, Gymnasium, and the Medical unit. These spaces will be retained. Some functional changes will occur during the phasing of the plan and these will be described in the Operations and Programs section.

The administration wing of the Main Building will also be retained. It includes institutional administration, the Intake/Classification unit, Inmate property storage, the Chapel and Chaplains' offices, a central control unit and the institutional laundry. Again, some functional changes will occur and will be described later.

B. The Minimum Security Unit

Since the inmates assigned to this unit will not represent security risks, (See Appendix IV for definitions), this unit can be located outside the perimeter fence. However, the unit should still be within reasonable proximity to the Main Building to permit pedestrian traffic between the two locations and the delivery of bulk meals from the Main Building.

The Main Building will functionally relate to the minimum security unit in terms of: meal preparation and delivery; central stores and inmate property storage; laundry (linen) service; initial intake of new inmates and preliminary classification; management and administrative services; medical services; visiting; chapel; gymnasium; emergency response support.

Given the nature of the inmate population housed here, a unit size of 60 inmates could be acceptable. The unit should be divided into physically separate sub-units of no more than 20 inmates. Optimally, living accommodations should be in individual rooms and, at a minimum, on the basis of two inmates per room. There should be no dormitory type housing. Rooms should be sized to accept double bunking if needed in the future.

Each sub-unit should contain: a group dining area; a servery station; an inactive recreation space; a multi-purpose program/classroom area; shower and toilet facilities.

Direct staff visual supervision into the sub-units is preferred but not essential. Staff work stations should be close to the sub-units. Offices should be provided for the Unit Manager, Case Manager, and Correctional Supervisor. An interview room should be provided.

Security construction, fixtures and hardware will be minimal. A perimeter alarm will be required. Unit entrance locking and sub-unit entrance locking will be required. Individual room (cell) locking is not required for security purposes, but standard keylock doors will be provided for inmate security of their personal property in the rooms.

C. The Medium Security Units

Since the inmates assigned to these units will represent security risks, (See Appendix IV for definition), these units will be located within the perimeter fence. The units should be within proximity to the Main Building to permit pedestrian traffic between the unit and Main Building and the delivery of bulk meals.

In considering spatial relationships of the units to one another, it is important to consider the basic categories of inmates who will comprise the medium security group. Two groups, the protective custody and sex offender populations, are not generally management problems within an institution. They are not likely to attempt to escape, but are generally incarcerated for serious crimes against the person. There could be significant public apprehension concerning an escape, individually or collectively, by this group. Collectively, this group is not regarded as aggressive although individuals may be aggressive and potentially violent. By virtue of reputation, nature of offence, publicity or timidity this group of offenders is maintained in separate, protected facilities due to the likelihood of aggression from other inmates. The level of aggression could be life threatening.

Accordingly, the unit holding the protective custody/sex offender populations presents special needs in terms of site and internal security within the complex. As much as possible, this unit should be separated from the other medium, medium/maximum security units. The space and location

allotted for the unit ought to have the potential for autonomous, separated functions to take place, e.g. recreation. Individual or collective protective custody inmate movement within the complex will be escorted by correctional staff. In the event of a riot or other group disturbance within the complex, this unit needs to be physically protected from potential attack by hostile inmates who may be acting in an organized fashion. A separate pocket of security fencing within the complex to contain the unit or a hardened "shell" for this building may be a design solution.

The other medium security and medium/maximum security units do not require this kind of separation from one another nor are special enclaves needed. The units should however, have a reasonable amount of space of their own partly for inactive recreation purposes, but also to reinforce the concept spatially that each unit is a separate entity.

The Main Building will functionally relate to the medium security units in terms of: meal preparation and delivery; central stores and inmate property storage; laundry service; initial intake of new inmates and preliminary classification; management and administrative services; medical services; visiting; chapel; gymnasium; and emergency response support.

With the possible exception of the protective custody/sex offender group the nature of the medium-security population will have a higher proportion of difficult to manage individuals and inmates who present the potential of belligerence toward staff or one another. A unit size of 40 inmates is recommended with divisions into separate sub-units of no more than 20 inmates. Living accommodations should be in individual rooms. There should be no dormitory type housing.

Each sub-unit should contain a group dining area; a servery station; an inactive recreation space; a multi-purpose program/classroom area; showers. Toilet facilities should be in the individual rooms to permit lock-downs of the rooms or units during the night or under special circumstances.

Direct staff visual supervision into the sub-units is essential. Staff work stations should be located with this principle in mind. Offices should be provided for the Unit Manager, Case Manager, and Correctional Supervisor. An interview room should be provided.

Security construction will be necessary. A perimeter alarm system will be required. Unit and sub-unit entrance locking is required. Individual rooms will have the capability of remote locking from the staff station. The staff work stations should be capable of being secured. A means of egress from the work station in the event of an emergency should be considered. Windows in these units will be security glazed.

D. The Medium/Maximum Security Unit

An evaluation of historical experience as well as potential future scenarios suggests that approximately 20 inmates will require maximum security surroundings (See Appendix IV for definitions), and/or segregation from the rest of the inmate population. As such, a figure of 20 inmates is not likely a sufficient volume to cost-efficiently warrant an independent facility of its own. Accordingly, the plan is to house this maximum security group in two sub-units of a modified medium security unit. This unit will be located within the perimeter fence. It will be the closest unit to the Main Building to permit ready and rapid pedestrian traffic between the unit and the Main Building and for the delivery of bulk meals.

This unit does not require the kind of spatial separation from other units such as in the case of the protective custody/sex offender unit. It should, however, relate to its own space and reinforce the concept that this unit is a separate entity. Depending upon the design solution selected, this unit may require placement in such a fashion that an enclosed fresh-air exercise yard can be affixed to the unit. Such an exercise yard will relate only to the maximum security sub-units.

The Main Building will functionally relate to the medium/maximum security unit in terms of: meal preparation and delivery; central stores and inmate property storage; laundry service; initial intake of new inmates and preliminary classification; management and administrative services; medical services; visiting; chapel; gymnasium; and emergency response support.

This unit will essentially be two distinct units in one building. Total unit size will not exceed 40 inmates. Sub-unit size will be 10 inmates, divided into 4 sub-units which are independent of one another and physically separate. Two of the sub-units will contain medium security inmates. One sub-unit will contain disassociation/punitive segregation inmates. One sub-unit will contain administrative segregation inmates. It can be expected that maximum security inmates will present a profile of being either difficult to manage, potentially dangerous, or highly prone to escape attempts. Length of stay in the punitive segregation sub-unit will vary from a few days to a few weeks. Length of stay in the administrative segregation unit will be a minimum of one month and could be total sentence length. Inmate housing in all sub-units shall be single room.

The two medium-security sub-units and the administrative segregation sub-unit should contain: a group dining area; a servery station; an inactive recreation space; a multi-purpose program/classroom area; showers. The punitive segregation sub-unit should contain a small servery station and showers. Individual inmate room doors in both segregation sub-units should have tray slots. Toilet facilities should be in the individual rooms. In the case of the segregation sub-units, maximum-security water closet fixtures are to be installed.

Direct staff visual supervision into the sub-units is essential. Staff work stations should be located with this principle in mind. Offices should be provided for the Unit Manager, Case Manager and Correctional Supervisor. An interview room should be provided.

Security construction will be required. An enclosed fresh-air exercise area relating to the two segregation sub-units only will need to exist. A perimeter alarm system is required. Unit and sub-unit entrance locking is required. Individual rooms will have the capability of remote locking from the staff station. The staff work stations should be capable of being secured and an emergency means of egress from them should be considered. Windows in these units will be security-glazed.

E. Other Buildings and Space

In addition to the existing Main Building structure, the Headingley complex includes: two minimum-security annexes; a trades building; powerhouse; greenhouse; cottages; sewage treatment plant; water treatment plant; water intake pump house; tractor and implement shed; a root cellar and some storage sheds.

The grounds around the complex include: a security-fenced sportsfield; a 'greenbelt' fronting the institution; garden acreage and a tree farm to the east of the buildings; undeveloped land to the west of the buildings. A significant amount of acreage fronting the Trans-Canada highway is leased to a local farmer.

The following observations apply to these buildings and space in relation to the development plan:

1. Existing Annexes

Two minimum-security annexes exist in close proximity to the Main Building. These facilities were built in 1953 and 1958 respectively. Although they have been chronically overcrowded for many years, these facilities can probably hold no more than 40 inmates apiece with proper living conditions.

Given the placement of these annexes within the complex, it is very probable that they will fall within the new perimeter security fence. This, together with a realistic inmate population threshold of about 40 inmates, would tend to preclude use of either Annex as the new minimum-security unit.

However, these annexes should be evaluated for renovation and conversion to medium-security units. As has been noted, they should be able to accommodate the approximate volume of a medium-security unit. They are situated appropriately in the complex. They have recently been fire-upgraded. Functionally, they possess a number of the requirements of a standard medium-security unit.

2. Trades Building

This building is of recent vintage and is equipped for three trades: carpentry; painting; and a tailor shop. It will continue to operate under the Campus Plan and will be within the perimeter security fence. It will be a source of work and training for medium-security inmates.

3. Powerhouse, Sewage Treatment Plant, Water Treatment Plant, Pump House, Implement Shed

These are Department of Government Services buildings. Heat, power, water and sewage systems will need to be modified to accommodate the redevelopment plan.

4. Greenhouse

This is an old but serviceable structure and is of utility to the institutional gardens. It will continue to operate.

5. Cottages/Pasteurization Shed

These buildings are left over from the days of the institutional farm. They are used mainly for storage now. They will serve no purpose in the future and should be demolished to make way for the construction of new living units in this area.

6. Root Cellar/Storage Sheds

The root cellar is used to store potatoes and other tubers produced by the institutional gardens. Its use will continue. The storage sheds date back to the institutional farm and could be moved or demolished.

7. Sportsfield

The sportsfield would continue to function as an area of group exercise, team sports and special events. The sides of the sportsfield facing inward to the complex need not be fenced. The external sides would require secure fencing and could form a part of the greater perimeter security fence.

8. Greenbelt

The greenbelt would be retained and would be maintained by minimum security inmates.

9. Gardens/Tree Farm

The institution's gardens would be retained and would be maintained by minimum security inmates.

10. Undeveloped/Leased Land

There are no current plans for the use of this land in the development plan. However, it should be noted that a sweatlodge site exists approximately a kilometer west of the institution proper. This is considered sacred ground and no plans should be made to dispose of or disturb this property. The sweatlodge is used a few times annually by Headingley inmates.

11. Undeveloped Space Within the Perimeter Fence

There are several considerations with regard to the space within the future perimeter security fence. First, sufficient space should be allowed for any necessary expansion of the number of units within its perimeter. The maximum threshold of the complex within the perimeter fence should be eight (8) units, including the two existing annexes.

Pedestrian walkways will need to be established to all units. All roads and walkways within the perimeter should be paved.

In the vicinity of the Trades Building allowances should be made for use of adjoining undeveloped land as industrial/construction space for work on projects the inmates are undertaking. A generous space should be set aside for the storage of lumber and the potential establishment of a weather shed.

F. The Perimeter Security Fence

The perimeter security fence will enclose all medium and maximum security units together with their interconnecting space to the Main Building. It will encompass the Sportsfield, the Trades Building and its associated industrial space and provide for sufficient space in the complex to permit unit expansion in the future.

The purpose of the perimeter is to delay attempted escapes, bring attention to any attempted escape or attack and to present a visual barrier and thereby deter potential escapees. The perimeter fence is a mandatory element of the Campus Plan.

The basic components of the perimeter security fence consist of two parallel wire mesh fences erected in straight lines with a 6.6 metre gravel strip between the fence lines. These fences are located so as to allow continuous and total visual surveillance. Both inner and outer fences are 4.2 metres high with angled support arms at the top of the posts supporting rolls of concertina tape foil. The fence is equipped with a Perimeter Intrusion Detection System.

Pedestrian and vehicular access through the fence is by means of a secure sallyport with motorized gates.

Manual inspection and surveillance of the fence is facilitated by a perimeter lighting system adjacent to the exterior fence line and by a perimeter patrol road which follows the outside of the exterior fence line.

Detailed specifications for the perimeter security fence may be found in Appendix "V".

G. Summary of Building Requirements

Based upon current and projected inmate population levels (see Appendix III), the following represents building requirements under the Campus Plan:

1. Construction of a perimeter fence and vehicular sallyport.
2. Conversion of two existing minimum-security units into two 40 bed medium-security units.
3. Construction of one 60 bed minimum-security unit.*

4. Construction of three 40 bed medium-security units.
5. Construction of one 40 bed medium/maximum security unit.

The above construction would produce a complex capable of handling approximately 300 inmates, the projected population level for Headingley in the 1990's and based upon removal of all remands to the new Remand Centre. The 300 figure will be required, in any event, to accommodate atypical fluctuations and 'surge counts' which have been customary in the past and present.

* The 60 bed minimum-security unit should be double-bunked and sized accordingly. Intermittent-sentenced inmates are not included in this projection nor in this summary. A separate 40 bed residential trailer would need to be installed adjacent to the minimum-security unit if this group were factored in.

SECTION FOUR

PROGRAMS AND OPERATIONS

A. Principles
B. Unit Management
C. Unit Programs and Operations
D. Central Programs and Operations

IV. Programs and Operations

A. Principles

As part of the Manitoba Corrections system, Headingley subscribes to the Mandate and Mission Statement of the organization. The Mandate and Mission Statement directs that:

"Corrections is an integral part of the criminal justice system; it shares the responsibility for the protection of society, the prevention of crime and the reintegration of the offender in the maintenance of law and order.

In carrying out these responsibilities, Corrections recognizes the need to cooperate and collaborate with other members of the justice system, the police and the community.

Corrections' programs and activities are directed to both the least restrictive intervention and the protection of the public. They focus on preventive measures, alternatives to formal court action, alternatives to incarceration, productive activity in custody, reparation to victims, victim/offender reconciliation, and the redirection of offenders.

In working towards the objectives the emphasis will be on effective communication, staff development, participatory management, effective use of volunteers and community participation."

Basic to the redevelopment plan for Headingley is the need to comply with the requirements set out in legislation. Secondly, the Mandate and Mission Statement must be translated into practical and achievable terms. The structure of programs and operations at Headingley will be consistent with the following principles:

1. Expanded Classification of Inmates

All inmates will be assessed with regard to security rating and immediate presenting needs at admission. More inmates, particularly those with significant sentences, will receive in-depth classification assessments. Classification is essential to the personal safety and social reintegration of inmates. It is vital to institutional security. Classification facilitates better program planning and rationalizes intervention.

2. Dynamic Security

The concept of security has an important place in the correctional system. However, the best way to protect the public is to ensure that the control of offenders in detention is not so dehumanizing that it compounds the offender's propensity toward anti-social behaviour. Security measures, therefore, must be sufficient but not excessive. They must allow for the offender to develop or demonstrate his ability to control himself and function in a responsible manner.

Security measures must be more dynamic than static. They must cultivate an inmate's sense of responsibility in his relations with staff and others. However, to make internal security more dynamic, peripheral security must be reinforced through appropriate protection systems. If the perimeter is better protected and containment assured, internal security can be reduced.

Coupled with the improvement of the static security system (perimeter) is the dynamic security provided by staff. A proper and controlled physical structure will permit more extensive use of dynamic security within a secure envelope. Close interaction between staff and inmates, the direct supervision method, is the first and best security approach.

Correctional officers must be able to understand the inmates in their charge and establish appropriate relationships with them. They must be able to reconcile security needs and program requirements.

While being able to control situations, Correctional Officers must assume more responsibility for implementing and monitoring inmate program plans. Co-ordinated program and security efforts within the context of a multi-disciplinary team will provide an integrated security approach.

3. Reintegrative Programs

Correctional programs, as a whole, make it possible for the inmate to acquire skills, to assume responsibilities and to develop socially acceptable living habits and values. A broad range of professional services are required to achieve this aim.

Improvements to the physical structure of the facility, smaller inmate groupings, expanded classification and the involvement of Correctional Officers in a dynamic security role will contribute to greater effectiveness of inmate programs. Program orientation must be relevant to the needs of offenders and directed toward preparing the offender for reintegration with the community.

It is obvious that a prison is not the best place to foster the social reintegration of inmates. Accordingly, wherever feasible, inmates will be directed toward participation or follow-up programs which operate within the community. Where this is not feasible, Corrections is convinced that inmates can begin to make progress in prison under the proper conditions.

Emphasis needs to be placed upon the offender gradually learning to cope with his release and the responsibilities involved. Programs will help the inmate to make the transition from closed custody to gradually less restrictive environments.

4. Productive Activity

Performing remunerated work and finding in it a source of personal growth are basic values of our society. Work is essential to the social reintegration of inmates. A priority will be the development of remunerated activity programs outside the detention environment for those who can work in non-secure settings and within the institutional envelope for those who cannot. It is recognized that compulsory jobs such as institutional maintenance must continue.

Recreation is an important aspect of prison life. Emphasis needs to be placed upon broadening the context of recreation to include not only physical activities but socio-cultural events, leisure activities and hobby crafts as well.

5. Integrated Case Management

This approach recognizes that both programs and security are essential to individual case management. The sharing of information, collaboration in planning and integration of security and program functions at the line and administrative levels is designed to improve inmate program planning, operations and services. This approach will also provide for the most effective organization of staff resources.

Case managers will increasingly serve as resource persons for Correctional officers. They will advise them and help them intervene more effectively. They will, however, still serve as experts in their field and will work directly with inmates.

B. Unit Management System

The transformation from a highly centralized institution to a truly decentralized complex calls for significant organizational change. The current vertical organization structure stresses a 'command and control' orientation. Such a structure is common to large institutions and has a reasonable degree of efficiency provided that the principles of control, standardization and uniformity of operation are primary organizational objectives. This structure does not adapt well to decentralization, delegation of authority, expectations of local initiative or local accountability. Similarly, the current 'core shift' method of staffing the institution is neither necessary nor useful in a unit-based structure. Staffing will be unit-based, not shift-based.

The structure and system which best suits decentralization and current organizational objectives is the unit management system. Unit management is a decentralized approach to institutional and inmate management. Within this concept, the institution will be divided into smaller, manageable segments centered on a housing unit, related security post(s) and specific program functions. A permanent team of multi-disciplinary staff is assigned to work with a Unit Manager. The team is accountable, along with the other units, for the overall security of the institution. Unit management is a logical development of the more effective elements of other operational systems currently in place within adult corrections, i.e.: squad and living unit systems. Similar organizational change to Unit Management is currently taking place within the Federal Correctional jurisdiction.

The organizational and staffing aspects of unit management will be discussed in Section V. With relation to programs and operations of the institutions, unit management plays a pivotal role.

The foundation of the unit management approach is based upon meaningful interaction between staff and inmates, teamwork and open communication. In essence, this means that interaction with inmates will be

an expectation for and responsibility of all institutional staff. Because the Correctional Officer's work brings him/her into daily contact with inmates more than any other staff member, the role they play within the unit management concept is significant. Correctional officers will be required to observe, interact and learn as much about inmates as possible in all areas of inmate activity. Information compiled and knowledge gained in this process must be communicated to appropriate sources to be effective. Increased observation and interaction with inmates will yield improved security and more complete information will enhance the case management process.

Case management personnel will be directly responsible to the unit manager for all aspects of case management in the unit. This involves the functional supervision of the casework of line staff as well as direct responsibility for needs analysis and case preparation, case management strategies, case planning and treatment objectives. The case management officer will participate actively in all areas of unit operations and will be located in the unit, wherever possible. In the absence of the unit manager or correctional supervisor the case manager will be responsible for providing supervision to the unit. Case management personnel will be expected to work closely with the correctional supervisors in security related aspects of the unit's programs and operations. This specifically means that although searching, movement control and more structured observation of inmates is not a primary role of the case management officer, he/she will be expected to carryout these tasks as needed. This will allow for a more effective integration of case management and security.

The unit manager will be directly responsible to the Deputy Superintendent for all matters pertaining to the unit including case management, security, programming, health and safety and financial and administrative concerns. Unit managers will assume responsibility on a rotational basis as officer-in-charge of the institution after regular hours. It should be recognized that the Unit Manager in the minimum security facility will have a different focus than those in the medium security and

medium/maximum security units. In the minimum security unit the focus is upon community based programs with security being a secondary focus. In the higher level units the focus is reversed.

The correctional supervisor is directly responsible to the Unit Manager for the supervision of the team of officers assigned to a specific unit. The supervisor will be responsible for supervision of correctional officers in the unit. The supervisor will assist the unit manager in maintaining the overall security to the unit and the institution and will be actively involved in the case management process. Other responsibilities include coordinating and controlling the daily operational activities in the unit and initiating action on any irregularities or security risks. The Correctional Supervisor will usually perform this function under the direction of the Unit Manager. However, when the Unit Manager is not on the same shift as the Correctional Supervisor, the supervisor will assume the decision-making role of the Unit Manager.

C. Unit Programs and Operations

The differentiation of Headingley's inmate population into manageable, more homogeneous groups promotes institutional programming which is focused to the needs of specific groups. Unit programs and operations will address the opportunities and constraints presented by that unit's inmates. Similarly, resources will be allocated on the basis of particular unit needs.

The intent of the unit system will be best served by separating the sub-populations as much as possible. Separation should occur not only in terms of housing but in terms of program delivery, work and recreation. In smaller groups the opportunity and potential to develop pro-social attitudes and responsible behaviour is much enhanced. Furthermore, insulating the populations from one another assists staff in discouraging and controlling the 'inmate culture' which is pervasive in larger institutions. Controlling the inmate culture reduces the incidence of organized criminal activity among

inmates, intimidation, gang formation, racism and protective custody.

It is recognized that this principle of separation will, at times, need to be tempered by considerations of available resources, economies of scale and so forth. However, the unit system requires a great deal of autonomy for the individual unit and the opportunity to be as self-contained as possible in order to function effectively.

The following sections outline specific unit and sub-unit program orientations. A brief description of the manner of operation is offered.

1. Minimum Security Unit

The primary orientation of the minimum-security unit will be toward community reintegration. While the inmate is in the planning or preparatory stage prior to community release, basic activities will revolve around productive employment whether this be associated with a supervised community work project or an institutional job associated with the unit. In general terms, this unit will not be involved in the delivery of treatment programs. Length of sentence and low security risk considerations point toward community-based treatment programs as being more effective as a treatment strategy. Accordingly, case management of such inmates will focus upon appropriate referral to relevant programs in the community as part of overall pre-release planning.

The community orientation of this unit will require close liaison between the unit and the Community Release Centre (C.R.C.). While the unit will generate candidates for Temporary Absence consideration it will depend upon the C.R.C. to provide for community investigations, T.A. Supervision and case follow-up. Additionally, the C.R.C. will have a significant role in developing and coordinating activity relating to community work projects.

Educational and training needs of inmates of this unit will similarly be examined from a community resource perspective. Case planning strategy will focus upon means of connecting or reconnecting the inmate to relevant programs in the community.

For security and program reasons, it is important that these inmates have as little contact as possible with the higher security groups. Minimum security inmates should not be involved in any activity which would cause them to routinely require access inside the perimeter security fence.

2. Psych/Forensic Sub-Units

The primary orientation of the Psych/Forensic sub-units will be toward therapeutic programs and activities. Diagnostic procedures, detailed classification analysis and individualized casework will be important elements of the unit. Baseline activities will include medication management and behaviour supervision.

Variables such as sentence length, resource availability and the admixture of client conditions tend to preclude intensive, specialized treatment programs. Instead, an emphasis will be placed upon basic therapeutic approaches such as occupational therapy, art therapy and basic life skills training.

Case management will need to include consideration of pre-release planning since some of these inmates may not be able to transfer to the minimum security unit as a preparatory stage before release. Direct referrals from incarceration to community mental health resources can be expected.

A functional relationship will exist with the Medical Unit, its personnel and resources. Interview, office and group spaces will be more extensive than in other units to provide for expanded diagnosis, to accommodate visiting mental health professionals and to conduct group programs or team meetings. A "time-out" room with protective padding will be required to temporarily restrain individuals experiencing episodes of violent behaviour.

A modest vocational element would be desirable within the unit. This would involve providing a separate, non-integrated workshop. While separate active recreational space is not required for this group, it would receive its own scheduled time in outside space so as not to mingle with regular population.

3. Sex offender Sub-Units

The primary orientation of the sex offender sub-units will be toward direct provision of in-house treatment programs. Diagnostic procedures, detailed classification analysis and individualized casework will be important elements of the unit.

The sex offender program will be broadly based and interdisciplinary in nature. Its primary objective will be relapse prevention. Components of the program will include Anger Management, Stress Management, Communication Skills, impulse control, sex education, chemical dependency awareness, life skills development and a behavioral lab. The program will be group-based, working with 10-15 individuals per group. The program will be delivered within the unit in non-integrated group program space. Participation will be intensive and will occur five days per week. Participation levels are expected to be high.

For those individuals unwilling to participate in the program a maintenance base of activities is required. A segregated set of institutional jobs will be assigned to the unit to match with individuals who are not part of the treatment program.

Case management will need to include consideration of pre-release planning since most of these inmates will not be able to transfer to the minimum security unit in preparation for release. Direct release to community resources or employment can be expected. A relationship will exist with the C.R.C.

Separate active recreational space for this group is preferred but not essential. Common space could be used by scheduling specific periods of time which would be dedicated to this group.

4. Protective Custody Sub-Unit

The primary orientation of the protective custody sub-unit will be to provide, to the greatest extent possible, a full range of programs while at the same time maintaining protective isolation of this group.

Case management will need to include consideration of pre-release planning since these inmates will not be able to transfer to the minimum security unit as a preparatory stage before release. Direct release to community resources or employment will be expected. A relationship will exist with the C.R.C.

A small base of institutional job activities is required. A segregated set of institutional jobs will be assigned to the unit to match with individuals not actively participating in programs. Protective custody inmates can work in the same areas and participate in relevant programming with sex offenders. Similarly, these inmates can share the same recreational space or schedule with the sex offender group.

5. Medical/Isolation Sub-Unit

The primary orientation of the medical/isolation sub-units will be to provide medical care for the inmates requiring such services. The unit will have two components. One will be an in-patient treatment or convalescence component. The second will involve providing out-patient services to inmates who will be residing in other units.

For in-patients, some case management of a non-medical nature will be required, but program and work participation will usually be suspended pending return to their original units. Isolation inmates will require active case management and efforts will be made to offer access to programs available to the rest of the inmate population.

Out-patient services will include medical examinations of all new inmates, daily 'sick parades', medication management for the entire population, treatment follow-up, referrals to community health resources, health counselling, health education to staff and inmates, inspections and rounds of the entire facility.

Recreational facilities for in-patients will need to be accessible by wheelchair and provision for handicapped equipment and activities should be made.

6. General Population Units

General population units will be oriented toward providing a combination of treatment programs, education, training and job placements. This flexibility is necessary to accommodate the diverse needs of this more heterogeneous population and to account for the varying levels of individual cooperation which can be expected. Given the security risk presented by individuals within this category, security procedures will be more extensive and structured observation of behaviour will be a baseline requirement.

While it would be desirable to offer programs 'on unit' this may not be feasible for economic reasons, or because of the diversity involved. Common program areas are feasible and common programs would be open to all registered general population inmates.

Educational programs would be modular in nature and would feature as a base: basic literacy, 5-10; adult basic education; and computer-assisted learning. Trades training opportunities will be offered, some with related institutional jobs. Topics could include basic carpentry, painting, home-wiring, small engine repair, barbering, etc.

Treatment programs on a group basis will be targeted in three directions. First, a three week chemical dependency program ('Breaking Barriers') will be offered. Second, a twelve week anger management program will be offered. Third, life skills classes will be offered to general population inmates requiring the program as preparation for release.

Inmates not involved in, or motivated toward, program participation will be employed in a wide range of institutional jobs which will be located within the perimeter security fence or within the Main Building industrial area, (kitchen, laundry, etc.).

Case management will need to include consideration of pre-release planning since some of these inmates will not be able to transfer to the minimum security unit in preparation for release. Direct release from the medium security units to the community can be expected.

7. Administrative Segregation Sub-Unit

The primary orientation of the administrative segregation unit is to separate potentially dangerous inmates, or inmates posing a high security risk, from the rest of the inmate population. Security is the predominent focus of the unit's operations. Program activity in the unit will be limited and may be curtailed dependent upon the risks posed by this group at any given time.

For the most part, case management will be on the basis of individualized casework. Structured observation of behaviour will be integral to the duties of unit staff with regular, formal feedback to the reclassification process. Formal reclassification reviews at thirty day intervals will be an important element in the unit. Such reviews will have an emphasis upon evaluating the need for continued segregation.

Three basic program activities will be targeted for inmates of this unit. First, an anger management program of shorter but more intense duration may be warranted dependent upon the group profile in the unit. Secondly, an impulse control program may be warranted dependent upon the same variables. At a minimum, the unit will offer access to educational opportunities feasible to the unit such as correspondence courses, and possibly, computer assisted learning. All such programs will be sub-unit based with no integration to any other population group.

In the event of an institutional disturbance this unit may be converted temporarily to punitive segregation status.

8. Punitive Segregation Sub-Unit

The sole orientation of the punitive segregation unit is to fulfill a disciplinary segregation order of the institution's Disciplinary Board. Unit operations will be essentially security operations.

Inmates will have the opportunity for one hour per day to engage in out-of-cell activity by themselves. Access to a secure and segregated outdoor exercise space will be necessary. Inmates will have access to chaplaincy, medical, library and legal services. The unit will be inspected daily by a senior institutional manager.

D. Central Programs and Operations

The following sections of this report will discuss the role of central programs and operations of Headingley Correctional Institution during implementation of the Campus Plan and Unit System.

1. Intake/Preliminary Classification

The existing intake, classification and placement processes are based upon a centralized department which services the entire institution. All inmates are received by the Intake Unit and given a preliminary risk/needs analysis. Based upon a sentence length cut-off, some inmates receive a detailed classification analysis and report. All inmates are initially placed and subsequently transferred within the institution through the Placement Office function.

This level of centralization and control will be inefficient and counter productive under a decentralized unit system. Much more latitude, planning and control needs to be at the unit level in relation to classification and placement.

Under the Unit system, the intake function will remain as a centralized function. All new inmates will be received by this unit and housed for only such time as is necessary to complete a basic risk/needs analysis of the individual. The objectives of such an assessment will be to achieve a security rating, determine immediate needs of the inmate and to assess whether separation or segregation are required. Once such an assessment is complete the individual is transferred from the Intake Unit to an appropriate unit in

in the complex. The determination of the receiving unit will be based upon detailed unit criteria and with consultation between the intake unit manager and the manager of the potential receiving unit.

Upon arrival in the receiving unit, the inmate is subject to a more detailed classification analysis by the unit case manager which will outline planning and treatment objectives as well as a case management strategy. Placement in the sub-units will be based upon unit criteria and at the discretion of the supervisor in the unit.

Inter-unit transfers will be on the basis of consultation between unit managers and within guidelines established for the institution. The central Preventive Security Office will be involved in all initial unit placement decisions and inter-unit transfers.

The Intake Unit will retain responsibility for reconciliation of the inmate count on an institutional basis and central recording of placement and transfer activity. The unit will also manage institutional statistical activities and central data-management responsibilities relating to the overall inmate population. Sentence administration responsibilities will be retained in the Intake Unit together with the inmate legal file. Inmate program files will be retained in the unit in which the inmate is held and transferred with the inmate. Upon discharge of the inmate, program files are directed to the sentence administration section for integration with the legal file and subsequent inactive storage.

2. Work Programs

Currently, institutional job deployment is managed by the placement section. Community work program placement is managed by T.A. program administrative staff. In keeping with the concept of delegating authority and accountability to the Units, the job deployment and community work program functions will be transferred to the Units. This will be achieved by

matching related job groups to individual units based on an assessment of job security level, unit employment needs and job groupings which can be segregated. Following the delegation of work placement to the units, unit staff will relate directly with job supervisors and crew chiefs to match inmates to relevant institutional or community project employment.

(i) Minimum Security Employment

Minimum security inmates may be involved in day-release (D.T.A.) to the community to participate in their own employment, to seek community employment or to participate in job training programs. Inmates may also be on D.T.A. to participate in community work programs initiated by the institution or C.R.C. to serve other Government departments, private agencies, etc. Where this is premature or inappropriate, a large number of institutional job placements outside the perimeter security fence are available for these inmates.

There is seldom difficulty in finding work for minimum-security inmates. Current job placement opportunities for these inmates can range from approximately 40 jobs in the winter to more than 100 in the summer. This should be more than adequate for unit needs. If necessary, expansion of this base is not difficult.

(ii) Medium Security Employment

Medium security employment has always been problematic at Headingley Correctional Institution for a number of reasons. The security risk presented by these inmates, in general terms, precludes job development in any area which cannot be either physically secured or under the direct supervision of staff. With no industrial space in the Main Building excepting service areas such as the kitchen and laundry, employment prospects have been traditionally dismal. Consequently, unemployment rates for the Main Building inmates are much higher

than for minimum security settings. Underemployment is also problematic. Available job prospects in the Main Building are 'overstaffed' significantly, resulting in many 'make work' jobs which are more form than substance. Overall, the lack of meaningful and productive activity contributes to boredom, restlessness and poor morale among the Main Building inmates.

As a consequence of this unfortunate scenario, a very important emphasis of the Campus Plan is to increase the productive activity of medium security inmates. Decentralizing the medium security population out of the Main Building into a secure perimeter area opens up a large number of institutional jobs which were hitherto the preserve of minimum security inmates. For example, the Trades Building will be within the perimeter security fence and will afford job and training opportunities in carpentry, painting, and garment production. Grounds crews will be required. A waiting list exists for the pre-fabrication of playground structures and other structures which are delivered and assembled in the community. Space will be available within the perimeter to develop other small scale industrial options as necessary.

Based upon current requirements alone, the movement of the medium security inmates out of the Main Building will produce an additional 30-40 institutional jobs for them.

Having an adequate base of productive work activity for each medium security unit is an important complementary balance to program involvement and activity. Each inmate, whether enrolled in a program or a job, should be busy every day.

(iii) Maximum Security Employment

By virtue of the danger or security risk they present, coupled with a high incidence of uncooperativeness, employment opportunities and placements for these inmates are rare. Any work assignment considered would be sub-unit based, not integrated and would likely relate to unit housekeeping or hobbycraft activities.

3. Recreation Programs

This program is intended to develop leisure and social skills, physical fitness, self discipline, sportsmanship and, where possible, to maintain community contacts. There are many facets to an effective recreation program and these include: library services; a gymnasium; exercise equipment; outdoor space; arts and crafts; social/cultural space and activities and inactive recreation opportunities.

Recreational activities are generally coordinated by one central department in the Main Building Gymnasium. These activities relate primarily to Gymnasium and Sportsfield activities. There is much less coordination or organization over inactive recreation, social/cultural activities or arts and crafts.

Under the unit system, the Recreation department will retain coordination over Gymnasium and Sportsfield use. A new organizational branch, the Support Services Branch (described in Section V), will coordinate library services, social and cultural events common to the units and community contact in terms of non-sports events. Unit recreational activity, social/cultural activities unique to a particular unit and arts and crafts will be coordinated by the Units themselves.

(i) Minimum Security Requirements

Given the relatively short length of stay and community orientation of the minimum security unit, skill development by the institution in terms of recreation is not a priority. Space will exist in the multi-purpose area of the unit to engage in inactive recreation such as reading, card-playing, television and so forth. A separate space for arts and crafts is desirable but not essential. Outdoor space around the unit will be developed and landscaped by the inmates themselves for outdoor or team sports activities. Any scheduled access to the gymnasium will be governed by the principle that there will be no contact between any medium or maximum security group and the minimum security inmates.

(ii) Medium Security Requirements

Recreational activities are a greater priority for these inmates given the greater length of stay in the institution and the fact that community access is not possible. As with the minimum security unit, these units should have adequate inactive recreation space. A separate area in the unit should exist for arts and crafts activity and, at a minimum, storage space for arts and crafts is essential.

The segregated sub-units will require access to secure outdoor exercise spaces. While it is preferable that these spaces be specific to particular units, common outdoor or sports areas could be utilized by the segregated groups (eg. P.C.; sex offender; psych/forensic) provided their access was scheduled when the general population inmates were not present. Self-contained outdoor spaces should provide, at a minimum, reasonable area for a walk in the fresh air.

The existing Sportsfield will lie within the boundary of the perimeter security fence. The sports field presently contains a jogging track, horseshoe pits, baseball diamonds and a hockey rink. Provided that this area is not a site for unit construction, the Sportsfield could continue in its present function and serve as a scheduled, common recreational space for all medium security inmates.

The existing Gymnasium will lie within the institution's security perimeter. It has weight-training equipment, showers and change areas, equipment storage space, an office and a full-size gymnasium. As with the Sportsfield, this facility can be used as a common recreational facility for all medium security inmates.

An expanded and enhanced library will be developed in the Main Building, adjacent to the Gymnasium (current R.A. area). The Library will be accessible to all medium security inmates and will dispatch book selections and orders to the minimum and maximum security units. The Library will also serve as a resource centre to the unit educational programs.

At least two of the converted, former dormitory areas of the Main Building will be made available for social/cultural purposes. One space will be allocated for the exclusive use of the Native Brotherhood Society on a permanent basis. The second space could have flexible usage.

(iii) Maximum Security Requirements

The administrative segregation sub-unit requires a smaller multi-purpose area than that of a typical medium security unit given the smaller sub-unit size. The punitive segregation sub-unit does not require a multi-purpose area.

These sub-units require placement in such a fashion that a secure outdoor space can be affixed to the medium/maximum security unit. Maximum security recreation areas should be totally separate from other areas and screened from other inmates.

These inmates will not travel off-unit for recreational reasons. Their units will receive library services on a delivery basis from the Main Building library. Administrative segregation inmates may have access to arts and crafts activities although the range of media available will be restricted for security reasons.

4. Visiting/Correspondence

Visiting and Correspondence functions are currently co-ordinated centrally by one staff member. The existing Inmate Dining Room doubles at a large visiting area for most inmate visits. Segregated visits are handled in various interview rooms in the Main Building depending upon the security or supervision needs involved. Incoming and outgoing inmate correspondence is processed through the Visiting/Correspondence Officer.

This basic arrangement will continue under the Campus Plan. Several advantages accrue from this approach. First, a central visiting facility negates the need to build separate visiting spaces within individual units, thereby realizing a significant economy. Secondly, the existing facility is secure and will prevent visitors or other members of the public from gaining access within the perimeter fence. Thirdly, there are preventive security benefits to having a central person co-ordinate the visiting and correspondence functions.

In order not to compromise the basic principles of the unit system, the concept of population separations will continue with this functional area. Minimum security inmates will have a visiting schedule which does not bring them into contact with general population inmates. Protective custody and sex offender inmates may visit at the same time but not scheduled with general population. Administrative segregation visits will be non-contact visits and under secure conditions. These inmates will be individually escorted to and from the visit. Punitive segregation inmates do not receive visits unless specially authorized.

5. Administration

One of the economies of the Campus Plan is avoiding the duplication of administrative services. The existing Headingley management structure will be significantly reorganized to be compatible with the unit system. Management beyond the Unit Manager level will be provided centrally within the complex to all units. The proposed organization structure is described in Section V.

A central Support Services branch will be established to support Unit programming and operations. Similarly, a Preventive Security branch will coordinate security activities for the complex.

Accounting, personnel, clerical and central records services will be provided centrally. A central Staff Training Officer will co-ordinate general institutional training and assist Unit Managers in the provision of specific training content which may be unique to individual units.

6. Preventive Security Branch

Primary physical security will be provided by the unit's construction. Primary dynamic security will be provided by unit staff, procedures, programming and operations. The perimeter security fence will establish a static security barrier to prevent escape or intrusion into the complex.

The Preventive Security branch will provide a number of central services to support unit and complex security.

The Preventive Security branch will interact with the units on the following basis:

- serving as a technical resource on matters of institutional security;
- reviewing the security related aspects of policy from other disciplines;
- reviewing unit originated policy statements for compliance with central security directives;
- maintaining a clearinghouse of technical information on security practices, hardware and devices;
- co-ordinating aggregate purchases of security equipment and supplies;
- developing institutional standards for security equipment;
- conducting special investigations on behalf of the Superintendent in cases of disturbances, escape, emergencies or other unusual conditions;
- conducting specialized security training and management activities for unit line and supervisory staff;
- providing input on security issues in overall institutional staff training;
- gathering intelligence and disseminating intelligence information to authorized persons;
- taking appropriate action to curtail illicit activities.
- maintaining preventive security files.

Apart from this support and audit relationship to Unit operations, Preventive Security will operate a number of central service functions which include:

- static security functions associated with grounds patrol, fence patrol and manning the gatehouse (sallyport);
- visiting and correspondence functions (including staffing);
- relief staffing, as required, to supplement unit staffing;
- unit backup in terms of emergency response;
- institutional I/C responsibility on the midnight shift. Participation as I/C on other shifts based on a rotational schedule with the Unit Managers.

7. Support Services Branch

The Support Services branch will be a central resource and coordination mechanism to support unit programming and operations. Baseline activities of this branch will include:

- operation and staffing of the Recreation program;
- co-ordination of institutional social/cultural events;
- co-ordination of the volunteer program;
- co-ordination of the inmate education program. Co-ordination of industrial/trades training programs;
- operation of the 'services group' which includes central food services, laundry services, institutional stores, trades operations and liaison with the Department of Government Services;
- central liaison with the Community Release Centre;
- maintaining a library of contemporary journals, publications and professional materials for the use of Unit program and operations personnel;
- co-ordination of inter-unit programs, services and resources;
- co-ordination of the Temporary Absence program.

The services group will continue to provide basically the same products and services to the inmate population as it does now although there will be shifts in emphasis and alterations in the manner of operations. In the case of Food Services, the Main Building function will become one of centrally preparing food and delivering bulk meals to the units. Once inmates are out of the Main Building housing locations inmates will eat in their units, not in the dining room. The dining room will be converted to use as primary visiting space and for use as social/cultural space for large gatherings.

Trades operations will receive an increasing emphasis upon training the inmates assigned to their sections. This may tend to reduce the number of inmates employed in the larger sections but it will improve the quality of workmanship and the value of the job assignment. Trades operations will draw inmate trainees/workers from specified units. Selection of inmates and removal of inmates from trades assignments will be by means of mutual discussion and planning between the Unit Manager and Trades chief involved.

Alterations will be required to current inventory control and stores disbursement practices to take into account decentralization. Supply and ration control standards will need to be developed.

Current maintenance activities and inspection schedules are centralized. This will change drastically within the Campus Plan and unit system. Primary accountability for maintenance, security and sanitation inspections will fall onto the Units. Units will identify deficiencies and foreward work or improvement orders to the Support Services branch for priorization and action.

8. Chaplaincy

Chaplaincy services will remain as a centralized service and resource to the inmate population and to the Units. The Chapel will continue to be used for group religious services. Additionally, the provision of adequate multi-purpose areas within the units creates the opportunity for smaller services to be conducted on unit for inmates who are in separation or protection status.

9. Bannock Point Camp

Bannock Point is a minimum security camp located in the Whiteshell Provincial Park and is a satellite facility of Headingley. As such, Bannock Point represents a unit in itself and will be adapted to the unit system with a Unit Manager (Camp Supervisor) in charge. Bannock Point will continue to review and accept camp referrals from Headingley. Referrals will originate from the units.

10. Canteen

Canteen services will continue to be operated centrally from the Main Building although the location should be moved to the stores area in one of the newer Main Building wings. Unit inmates will place Canteen product orders which will be collected, processed and the goods delivered to the Units on a scheduled basis.

SECTION FIVE

ORGANIZATION AND STAFFING

A. Unit Staffing
B. Preventive Security Staffing
C. Support Services Staffing
D. Other Staffing
E. Total Staffing Summary

V. Organization and Staffing

As has been discussed in earlier sections, the movement to a decentralized system of operation necessitates significant changes to the traditional organization structure. Delegation of authority and attendant accountability become essential principles. Adult Corrections has selected the Unit Management model as being most reflective of its mission and objectives. Specifically, the unit system is the most effective means of furthering the integration of security requirements and rehabilitative efforts. Furthermore, within the context of the Campus Plan, a decentralized structure such as the Unit Management model is necessary to effectively manage a physically dispersed operation.

For comparison purposes, reference is drawn to Appendix "VI" which illustrates the current organization structure at Headingley. The present structure is well suited to a centralized, monolithic environment. Work is done through a number of specialized departments which operate quite independently of one another. Lateral communication is difficult and has often been problematic. Integrated efforts are virtually impossible in any long term sense. Authority and accountability are very high in the organization. The structure promotes and rewards uniformity within disciplines. Local initiative or innovation is difficult and frustrating for staff. Interestingly, the current structure also promotes functional differentiation which tends to fragment at lower levels of the organization and often works at cross purposes to the uniformity desired.

In contrast to large, specialized departments the Unit Management model produces a series of small but complex organizations and unit staff members have major decision-making responsibilities.

The Unit Manager has administrative accountability in areas including security, case management, personnel, staff training, safety, sanitation, budget, research and unit programming. Unit staff are delegated authority to make decisions in inmate discipline, work programs, educational and vocational training assignments, leisure time activities, orientation programs and release plans. The Unit Manager serves as an ongoing advisor to the institution's administration on matters of inmate management, security and programs. All living units relate organizationally to one senior manager rather than to a diversity of section heads and intermediate managers. Specialized or centralized operations are concentrated in only two branches whose mission it is to support, coordinate and facilitate unit operations.

TYPICAL UNIT ORGANIZATION



* Some Units may have additional specialized personnel depending upon the nature of program involved, diagnostic needs, etc.

** Trades personnel would function within the Support Services Branch.

INSTITUTION ORGANIZATION UNDER THE UNIT SYSTEM*



* This is one possible design

Staffing

Until such time as actual unit design, population groupings and physical construction plans are completed it is difficult to provide an exact determination of staffing requirements under the new system. Nevertheless, the following analysis should provide an approximation of the staffing necessary.

A. Unit Staffing

- The following analysis is based upon an assumption of seven (7) units.
- One (1) work crew officer/unit has been factored into unit staffing calculations. Distribution of such officers among units will vary dependent upon population groupings.
- Unit staffing will incorporate supervisory staff for 16 hours/day only. Night shift supervision will be provided by the institutional I/C and Preventive Security Patrol Supervisor.

Shift Pattern: Unit Staffing

Day	Evening	Night
Unit Manager Case Manager Correctional Supervisor 2 Correctional Officers Work Crew Officer	Correctional Supervisor 2 Correctional Officers	2 Correctional Officers

Unit Staffing Required:

1	Unit Manager/Unit
1	Case Manager/Unit (other specialists may be required in some units)
3.3	Correctional Supervisors/Unit (1 post x 16 hrs/day x 365 ÷ 1760 hrs/S.Y.)
10	Correctional Officers/Unit (2 posts x 24 hrs/day x 365 ÷ 1760 hrs/S.Y.)
1	Work Crew Officer/Unit (see comments above re: distribution)
16.3	S.Y./Unit

Unit Staffing total = 114.1 S.Y. (16.3 x 7)

B. Preventive Security Branch

The Preventive Security Branch will provide the following functions:

- Perimeter security and patrol
- Gatehouse (sallyport)
- Escorts
- Visiting/Correspondence
- Rotational I/C responsibility with the Unit Managers
- Intelligence functions
- Unit backup in cases of emergency
- Night supervisor (mobile)

Shift Pattern: Preventive Security

Day	Evening	Night
1 Manager		
1 Assistant Manager		
1 Correctional Supervisor	2 Correctional Supervisors	2 Correctional Supervisors
2 Patrol Officers	2 Patrol Officers	2 Patrol Officers
1 Gate Officer	1 Gate Officer	1 Gate Officer
1 Relief Officer	1 Relief Officer	
1 Visiting/ Correspondence		
*part-time visiting/supervi	sion officers*	
2 Escort Officers		

Preventive Security Staffing Required:

1	Manager	
1	Assistant Manager (including Intelligence functions)	
1	Visiting Correspondence Officer	
8.3	Correctional Supervisors	(1 post x 24 hrs x 365 ÷ 1760)
		(1 post x 16 hrs x 365 ÷ 1760)
10	Patrol Officers	(2 x 24 hr. x 365 ÷ 1760)
5	Gate Officers	(1 x 24 x 365 ÷ 1760)
6.6	Relief Officers	(2 x 16 x 365 ÷ 1760)
2.4	Escort Officers	(2 x 8 x 260 ÷ 1760)

Preventive Security Branch Staffing Total = 35.3 S.Y. and term-time for part-time visiting supervision staff

C. Support Services Branch

The Support Services Branch will provide the following functions:

- Program support
- Education/Training co-ordination
- Trades/Services
- Recreation program and staffing
- Volunteer co-ordination
- Supervision of Community Release Centre
- T.A. program co-ordination

Support Services Branch Staffing required

1 Manager
1 Inmate Training Co-ordinator
*1 Services Officer
*1 Psychologist
*1 Food Services Supervisor
*1 Laundry Supervisor
*14 Trades personnel (kitchen, laundry, carpentry, tailor, painting, etc.)
*1 Recreation Supervisor
*5 Recreation Officers
*2 C.R.C. staff

*Current staffing level

Support Services Branch staffing required = 28 S.Y.

D. Other Staffing

Other staffing areas include:

- Senior Managers
- Administrative services
- Chaplaincy
- Intake/Classification
- Bannock Point Camp
- Health Care Unit
- Staff Training

Taking into account existing staff allocation to these functions and allowing for anticipated effects of reorganization, staffing requirements for these areas may be:

1 Superintendent
1 Deputy Superintendent
1 L.R.C.
2 Chaplains
11 Intake/Classification Staff
9 Health Care Staff
11 Bannock Point Camp Staff
1 Staff Training Officer
16 Administrative staff (Accounts, Payroll, Stores, Clerical, Admin, etc.)

Total Other Staffing required = 53 S.Y.

E. Total Staffing Summary

Unit Staffing required	= 114.1	S.Y.
Preventive Security	= 35.3	S.Y.
Support Services	= 28	S.Y.
Other	= 53	S.Y.
	230.4	S.Y.

As of the 1989/90 Budget, Headingley and Bannock Point have an authorized complement of 227.5 S.Y.

APPENDICES

I. Fire Protection, Health and Safety Projects: H.C.I.
II. Existing Headingley Complex
III. Future Inmate Population Levels: H.C.I.
IV. Security Rating Definitions
V. Technical Specifications: Perimeter Security Fence
VI. H.C.I. Organization Chart: 1988

APPENDIX I

FIRE PROTECTION, HEALTH AND SAFETY PROJECTS IDENTIFIED FOR HEADINGLEY CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION

PROJECT	ESTIMATED COST ($,000's)
1. Asbestos Removal	$300.0
2. Fire Escape Towers/Smoke Zones	$400.0
3. Standpipes Installation	$200.0
4. Fire Detection/Alarm System	$415.0
5. Ventilation System	$850.0
6. Windows/Security Grille Installation	$700.0
7. Smoke Exhaust System	$ 80.0
8. Conversion To Electrical Locking System	$600.0 - 800.0
9. Infectious Disease Unit	$550.0 - 1,275.0
Current Remedial Projects	$4,095.0 - $5,020.0



APPENDIX II

APPENDIX III

FUTURE INMATE POPULATION LEVELS AT HEADINGLEY CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION

INTRODUCTION

In order to produce a long-term plan for Headingley Correctional Institution, it is imperative that future inmate population load for the facility be established as accurately as possible. The following sources of information were examined to assist in the projection of population levels.

First, the Corrections initiatives with relation to the opening of Milner Ridge and the construction of the new Remand Centre were taken into account. These projects were, as part of their objectives, intended to downsize Headingley's inmate population.

Secondly, national and provincial trends with regard to crime rates were examined. Census data (1986) and C.C.J.S. data (1987) were evaluated, particularly with regard to incarceration rates and comparative population levels. Manitoba rates since 1981 were reviewed for trend and pattern.

Thirdly, the specific historical record of Headingley's population levels since 1983 was assessed. A Working Group consisting of Headingley personnel contributed their experience and expertise in analyzing the raw data.

While consideration was given to things that may occur in the future which could impact upon population levels, this is treacherous ground to build upon. Essentially, the first three categories of information were evaluated against the near future in an effort to determine whether trend data from the past several years was likely to be significantly affected by forthcoming issues or actions which were suspected and likely to take place.

For facility planning purposes, an evaluation of population levels must go beyond a simple quantitative projection. A comprehensive program plan requires consideration of qualitative aspects as well.

As part of the evaluation of future inmate population levels for Headingley Correctional Institution, consideration was given to: security rating; inmate management groupings; separations required; sentence length categories; and presenting issues in terms of inmate program needs.

The following information is a summary of the population level analysis:

A. The Effect of Milner Ridge

Divisional planning calls for Milner Ridge to achieve a rated inmate population level of 120. At least in the short term, Milner Ridge is to absorb its inmate population exclusively from Headingley inmate transfers. Assuming 100% occupancy at Milner Ridge, the quantitative effect upon Headingley's population will be to reduce Headingley's count by 120.

Milner Ridge will be primarily a minimum security institution with a minority of medium-security inmates present. Current Milner Ridge transfer criteria calls for:

- more than 2 months to serve in sentence
- no outstanding charges of a serious nature and for which a court appearance is in excess of 30 days of transfer to Milner Ridge
- conviction offences do not include serious violence or escape
- the inmate will not have an assaultive or violent profile
- the inmate will not be considered an escape risk
- the manageability level will be consistent with a minimum -security, camp setting.

This criteria, when applied to available Headingley population, will probably produce a Milner Ridge population profile which is 66% minimum-security and 34% low-medium; 80 inmates of the first category and 40 of the second, respectively.

IMPACT OF MILNER RIDGE UPON
HEADINGLEY SECURITY PROFILE
BY SECURITY RANGE



BEFORE MILNER RIDGE
405 Bedspaces



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285 Bedspaces

HEADINGLEY AVG. DAILY POPULATION



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

AFTER MILNER RIDGE
285 Bedspaces

B. The Effect of the New Remand Centre

Once the new Provincial Remand Centre is fully operational (projected 1991) it will absorb all of Headingley's purely remand inmates. As of 1988 figures, this would reduce Headingley's population by approximately 38 inmates.

This reduction of inmates will also have a qualitative impact upon the inmate population profile at Headingley. This is demonstrated in the accompanying graphs.

IMPACT OF NEW REMAND CENTRE UPON
HEADINGLEY SECURITY PROFILE
BY SECURITY RANGE...See Appendix IV



BEFORE NEW REMAND CNTR
285 Bedspaces



AFTER NEW REMAND CNTR
247 Bedspaces

HEADINGLEY AVG. DAILY POPULATION



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

AFTER NEW REMAND CNTRE
247 Bedspaces

The cumulative effect of Milner Ridge and the new Remand Centre will place Headingley's inmate population level at approximately 250 inmates by 1991. The institution will be basically a medium-security complex (68%) with a smaller but significant minimum-security component (24%). Very secure facilities will be required for dangerous inmates (8%). A significant proportion of the total population (39%) will be special management inmates including: protective custody; administrative segregation; medical cases; psychiatric cases; and punitive segregation.

This, then, will be the base population at Headingley at the conclusion of current Divisional initiatives.

C. Factors Which May Impact the Base Population

1) From 1979 to 1986 there was a 28.5% increase in crimes of violence nationally (crime rate /100,000). There was no incidence of decrease in the eight year period. The annualized rate of increase nationally for violent crime is 3.6%.

2) From 1979 to 1986 there was a 13% increase in property crime. There has been some downturn from the 1981/82 levels and 1984-86 was a relatively stable period. The annualized rate of increase nationally for property crime is 1.6%.

3) National population growth is less than 1%. Provincial population is stable. Unemployment rates have improved since the 1983/84 levels. Generally, the economy has been growing at a modest rate with stable inflation. The population is aging in proportion.

MANITOBA ADULT CRIME

ALL ADULTS CHARGED

INCLUDES ONLY CRIMINAL CODE OFFENCES



Source STAT CAN. Uniform Crime Reports

MANITOBA ADULT CRIME

ALL ADULTS CHARGED

INCLUDES ONLY CRIMINAL CODE OFFENCES



Source STAT CAN: Uniform Crime Reports

4) In 1987, Manitoba had a rate of 11,348 c.c. offences/100,000 population compared to the national average of 9,180/100,000, a difference of 19%. The higher rate for Manitoba was influenced by both violent and property crime rates which were among the higher levels in the country.

5) The percentage change in the number of crimes of violence between the five year average (1982-86) and 1987 indicate that the average national rate had higher percentage increases for those offences (20%-27%) compared to Manitoba (16%). This may indicate a recent atypical upward fluctuation of Manitoba's violent crime. In examining property offences, Manitoba's increase of 11% exceeded the average national increase of 2% significantly.

6) Federal statute offences for narcotics/drugs had a rate of 240 for the national average while Manitoba had a rate of 282 in 1987. This was an increase of 28% for Manitoba over the five year average.

7) The Provincial Statute rate (1,219) for Manitoba was lower than the national average (1,486) for 1987.

8) Manitoba's rate of incarceration /100,000 has risen from approximately 10 in 1981 to 11 in 1988. This exceeds the national average of 9.

9) Average daily counts from 1981 to 1988 have grown by approximately 20% over the past eight years. The rate of growth has been consistent. This yields an annualized increase of 2.5%.

10) Headingley admissions and population levels over the past five years have been somewhat erratic. When compared to 1983 the years 1984-85 yielded 18% reductions in admissions but 1986-87 yielded increases of 17% - 22%.

11) Resident days shows a similar erratic pattern but the past few years have stabilized and an increase of 6% over 1983 is indicated.

12) Average daily population figures for H.C.I. not surprisingly reflect the instability of points (10) and (11) above. The 1987 figure of 404 is approximately 6% higher than 1983.

13) There have been some significant shifts in offence categories:
- sexual offences are up sharply over 1983, by 60%
- violent offences are up sharply over 1983, by 27%
- property offences are down from 1983, by 13%. The rate of decrease has been relatively consistent
- robbery and extortion offences are down 26% from 1983
- there have been wide fluctuations from year to year in the driving offence and narcotics/liquor offence categories

14) There appear to be shifts in the length of sentence categories:

- the less than 7 day sentence category has steadily diminished
- the 31-120 day categories have all shown consistent and significant increases in the past five years
- the 121-270 categories have been unstable but seem to indicate a declining trend
- the 271-365 category is unstable but appears to be on the increase
- the 366-729 categories indicate declining trends although there is instability

D. Summary of Significant Factors

1) Violent crime is increasing both nationally and locally at a significant rate.
2) Property crime appears to be stabilizing nationally but Manitoba's rate is significantly higher.
3) Manitoba exceed the national average increase in narcotic/drug offences.
4) Manitoba's rate of incarceration is on a gradual increase and exceeds the national average.
5) Annualized growth in Manitoba daily counts is 2.5% over the last seven years.
6) Resident days shows a modest increase in the past five years.
7) Violent offences including sexual offences are up sharply in the past five years.
8) Non-violent offences appear to be stable or declining.
9) Very short sentences are declining. Short to mid-range sentences are increasing. Very long sentences appear to be decreasing.

SENTENCED ADMISSIONS BY MOST SERIOUS OFFENCE



SENTENCED ADMISSIONS BY LENGTH OF SENTENCE



E. Conclusions

1. The Headingley base population of 250 in 1991 should be expected to expand by approximately 2.5% annually provided conditions reasonably similar to those experienced in the last ten years prevail. A projection to the year 2000 would indicate the following population levels:

1991 = 256
1992 = 261
1993 = 267
1994 = 272
1995 = 277
1996 = 283
1997 = 288
1998 = 294
1999 = 299
2000 = 308

This analysis has not taken into account the current Exchange of Services Agreement with the Federal Government for twenty (20) Federal beds in Manitoba institutions in return for a capital contribution to the construction of the new Remand Centre. The analysis also does not take into account any future E.S.A.'s with the Federal Government.

2. It would be prudent to built toward the 300 figure immediately in order to account for anticipated expansion of the base population over the next ten years. Given the volatility of occasional population fluctuations and 'surge counts' which can last for months at a time, it would be advisable to build for the 300 figure at the outset.

3. Given that this is a long-term plan, the redevelopment of Headingley Correctional Institution should provide for further expansion within the complex to allow for additional population and program demands which may exist in future decades.

4. Bearing in mind the qualitative impact of Milner Ridge, the expected population expansion at Headingley will tend to be comprised of more serious offenders with a significant portion displaying a violence profile.

5. The effects of ongoing and new initiatives in terms of incarceration alternatives, or de-institutionalization generally, will be to reduce the admission volume and length of stay of minimum-security offenders. Because Milner Ridge is designed to absorb the longer sentence length minimum-security offenders, the effects of incarceration alternatives will be felt on Headingley's minimum-security population level far more so than on the population of Milner Ridge. This tendency will promote the process of Headingley evolving into a predominantly medium-security facility.

6. Alternatively, initiatives of the deterrence or punishment variety will tend to increase the length of stay of offenders and, usually, of offenders considered of serious offences. By definition, most of these offenders would not be Milner Ridge material. The medium-security tendency at Headingley would continue.

APPENDIX IV

SECURITY RATING DEFINITIONS

Security rating definitions are extracted from the Manitoba Adult Corrections Admission Assessment system. Specific references are from the 1987 Procedures Manual: Admission Assessment Scale.

C-1: Minimum Security

Primarily involves inmates whose current offences and previous history of incarceration suggest that the person presents little or no threat to the institution's security or to the community at large. These inmates would normally be placed in minimum security areas and have access to outside work programs.

Admission Assessment Scale values: 0-4.5

C-2: Medium Security

Primarily involves inmates whose previous history of incarceration, in combination with the current offences suggests that the inmate may be a threat to the institution's security or to the community at large. Initial placement of these inmates should be in a secure location. Access to outside work and minimum security placement should only be considered after a period of assessment by institutional staff.

Admission Assessment Scale values: 5.0 - 6.5

C-3: Maximum Security

Primarily involves inmates whose previous history of incarceration includes incidents of escape and/or significant institutional misconduct. The current offences and the person's institutional background suggest that the inmate has a high probability of being a threat to the order of the institution. These individuals should be viewed as security risks and treated accordingly. These individuals are not to be excluded from reclassification, but significant behaviour change over an extended period is a definite pre-requisite.

Admission Assessment Scale values: 7.0 and up.

ADULT CORRECTIONAL SERVICES' ORGANIZATIONAL CHART
HEADINGLEY CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION

April, 1988



ADULT CORRECTIONAL SERVICES' ORGANIZATIONAL CHART
HEADINGLEY CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION

April, 1988



CORRECTIONAL OFFICER 1'S

CA017
CA018
CA023
CA024
CA025
CA029
CA030
CA036
CA038
CA042
CA044
CA051
CA052
CA058
CA059
CA061
CA064
CA071
CA073
CA074
CA079
CA080
CA084
CA089
CA091
CA093
CA095
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CA103
CA105
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CA425
CA453
CA454
CA455
CA464
CA470
CA473
CA474
CA475
CA485
CA487
CA488
CA489
CA490

FULL TIME TERM STAFF

CAL295
CAL342
CAL244
CAL280
CAL338
CAL242
CAL332
CAL288
CAL247
CAL287
CAL296
CAL285
CAL282

CAL286
CAL315
CAL281
CAL253
CAL297
CAL329
CAL340
CAL284

PART-TIME

CAL392
CAL393
CAL387
CAL386
CAL388
CAL384
CAL385
CAL390
CAL391
CAL383
CAL389

VISITING PART TIME

CAL462
CAL629
CAL944
CAL083
CAL800

PERIMETER SECURITY FENCES

1. PURPOSE AND SCOPE

Chain link Security Fences will form the perimeter of new Medium and Maximum Security Institutio where required by the project director to delay and bring attention to any attempted escape or attac

This Standard establishes requirements, necessary for security purposes, MANDATORY in the desig and installation of new or replacement Perimeter Security Fences.

The use of security walls or buildings will be considered as MANDATORY at urban locations.

1.1 Authority

This standard was prepared by Alberta Public Works, Supply & Services and sanctioned b the Solicitor General of Alberta.

There shall be no deviations, modifications or exceptions to this Standard without the prior written consent of the controlling authority.

1.2 Applicable Documents

This Document shall be read in conjunction with the following documents:

Technical Criteria Documents Project Siting - Planning Guidelines Security Gates Site Lighting Double Fence Lighting
Barbed Tape Secure Barriers
Military Specifications and Standards MIC.B.
52489A (MB) Barbed Tape Concertina.

2. DESIGN AND SECURITY REQUIREMENTS

This Section details the design and security requirements which are MANDATORY.

2.1 General Description

The basic components of the Perimeter Security Fence consist of two parallel fences, erected in straight lines, with a 6.6 m gravel strip between fence lines. These fences are to be located so as to allow continuous and total visual surveillance.

2.2 Components and Design Considerations

2.2.1 Location and Terrain

2.2.1.1 Security Fences shall be no closer than 12.5 m to a building wall or other structure, except the Gatehouses.

2.2.1.2 Where ground slope is severe, fence lines are to be stepped.

2.2.1.3 The top soil between the fences shall be removed to a depth of 100 mm and replaced with gravel.

2.2.1.4 Compound surface drainage must be via shallow swales and where necessary, gratings or other barrier types are to be used to maintain the integrity of the fence lines.

2.2.1.5 The ground at gates is to be raised, to prevent water from pooling or formation of ice.

2.2.1.6 Ponding of water between inner and outer fences shall be eliminated as it may interfere with electronic, sensor devices.

2.2.2 Fence Construction

2.2.2.1 Both inner and outer fences shall be 4.2 m high. Height refers to the uppermost continuous horizontal component.

2.2.2.2 Fences shall be erected straight so that from corner post to corner post fence lines shall be true in line so there are no hidden areas between fences.

2.2.2.3 Fence color may be required, to develop maximum contrast for closed circuit television viewing where the latter system is included.

2.2.2.4 All metal components of the Security fence shall be stainless steel or galvanized steel to be weather resistant.

2.2.2.5 All requirements detailed by System 'A' and 'C' are applicable in addition to the detail requirements which follow.

2.2.3 Supporting Concrete Barrier

2.2.3.1 This below-grade barrier is required for the entire inner fence line and shall be a minimum of 900 mm deep, sufficiently supported to prevent undue frost action distortion. (This barrier may be substituted, with previous approval by the Minister, by an underground electronic field detection system.)

2.2.3.2 Posts shall be secured in the concrete barrier.

2.2.3.3 Wire mesh may be secured in the concrete barrier as well, in which case a bottom tension wire shall be used instead of a bottom rail.

2.2.4 Posts

2.2.4.1 The system of line, corner and gate posts must be of a sufficient strength to meet local environmental conditions, particularly if the region is subject to wet snow or ice storms.

2.2.4.2 Posts shall be spaced 2.5 m apart maximum.

2.2.4.3 Line posts, minimal size to be 89 mm in O.D. 10.48 kg/m.

2.2.4.4 Gate strain and corner posts, minimum size to be 114.3 mm O.D. 15.92 kg/m. Strain posts to be spaced not more than 60 m apart.

2.2.4.5 Extra strength to be obtained by use of heavier posts or internal sleeved reinforcement.

2.2.4.6 Posts shall have caps and arms as necessary.

2.2.5 Rails

2.2.5.1 Rails required to brace fence posts and to support the fabric, shall be 50 mm in O.D. minimum.

2.2.5.2 Top and bottom rails are always required. An intermediate anchor clamp shall be used to secure the bottom rail, halfway between posts, to the concrete (on the inside line fence).

2.2.5.3 Intermediate rails are to be used only at the protected side of the fence fabric.

2.2.5.4 Fabric to be supported by top wire.

2.2.6 Wire Fabric (Chain Link)

2.2.6.1 Wire fabric shall be No. 6 gauge having a 50.8 mm mesh. Vinyl bonding is an option subject to cost considerations.

2.2.6.2 Wire mesh shall be continuous from top to bottom.

2.2.6.3 Top and bottom salvage to have a twisted and barbed finish.

2.2.6.4 The mesh to be stretched to the maximum without deforming or decreasing the vertical dimension of the material and then securely fixed to the top wire, bottom rail and posts. Secure mesh to gate, corner and terminal posts by means of bars and tension collars.

2.2.6.5 Wire ties shall be used to fix the mesh to the posts and rails. The wire ties shall be twisted on the side of the fence external to the Institution.

2.2.7 Tie Wires

All tie wire fastenings shall be snug fitting to prevent false alarm occurring in the Perimeter Intrusion Detection System.

No. 9 galvanized wire shall be used to secure the chain link to the top and bottom rail at approximately 450 mm intervals and to line posts at approximately 300 mm intervals. No. 16 gauge stainless steel wire ties shall be used to secure barbed tape. All tie wire fastenings shall be snug fitting to prevent false alarms occurring in the Perimeter Intrusion Detection System.

2.2.8 Top Wire

No. 6 gauge (5 mm diameter) galvanized wire is fastened to each post.

2.2.9 Angled Support Arms

2.2.9.1 Shall be at the top of posts every 2.50 mm minimum installed at 45 degree angles.

2.2.9.2 The arms shall be 600 mm long minimum and made from the same material as the line posts.

2.2.10 Barbed Wire

2.2.10.1 Three strands of four point barbed wire shall be secured tautly to the extension arms along the length of the fence with 125 mm spacing between the strands.

2.2.10.2 The wire gauge shall be No. 12.

2.2.11 Concertina Tape Coil

2.2.11.1 This tape is supplied clipped to hold a coiled shape (760 mm diameter weighing 14.5 kg) which pulls apart to a length of 16.5 m. Each coil shall be fastened 230 mm on centres to every third twist of the chain link fence.

2.2.11.2 Install with coil extended to only 13.5 m for greater density.

2.2.11.3 Refer to additional requirements for Barbed Tape.

2.2.12 Gates and Sally Ports

2.2.12.1 Pedestrian and vehicle gates and sally port gates are to match and be of equal quality to the line fence.

2.2.12.2 Particular attention is needed to detailing stops and guides as gates are subject to ramming. Remote controlled gates are to have extra heavy operators and tracks. see Technical Criteria. Security Gates.

2.2.12.3 All moving parts such as locking mechanisms or track must be designed and installed so that there is no binding, jamming or other malfunctioning.

2.2.12.4 Design the clear opening height at Gates and Sally Ports to comply with standard highway clearances.

3. RELATED INSTALLATIONS

The perimeter security fence is one element in the perimeter security system. The other elements in addition to the fence that must be considered are:

3.1 A perimeter patrol road with a 6.6 m wide gravel vehicle track located not closer than 6.0 m to the outside of the exterior fence line. This requirement is not mandatory, but must be reviewed at the discretion of the Project Director.

3.2 A perimeter lighting system adjacent to the exterior fence line.

3.3 Buried communications and other service lines to or within the Institution.

3.4 Other security systems (e.g. electronic sensing, underground).

3.5 Where appropriate snow fencing should be used.

3.6 Buried drains and ducts crossing fence lines.

PERIMETER SECURITY FENCES
DOUBLE FENCE SYSTEM


INTER-FENCE SPACE
EXTERIOR SIDE
TOP RAIL
INSTALL SINGLE OR DOUBLE COIL UNDER DIAGONAL ARMS 760 mm ∅ MIN.
NO. 6 GA. 50 mm GALV. WIRE MESH WIRE TIES NO. 9 GA. GALV. AT 300 mm O.C.
INTERMEDIATE RAIL OPTIONAL
PERIMETER FENCE POSTS DESIGNED TO MEET ICE, WIND AND STORM CONDITIONS
OPTIONAL COIL 760 mm ∅
STRANDS OF BARBED WIRE, NO. 12 GA. GALV. 1200 mm HIGH
760 mm BARBED TAPE CONCERTINA
200 mm THICK CONCRETE GRADE BEAM (NOT REQUIRED FOR SECURITY PURPOSES USE ONLY FOR STABILITY OF FENCE POSTS)
BOTTOM RAIL
GRADE
100 mm PIT RUN GRAVEL BETWEEN FENCES
INTER-FENCE SPACE 3M (MIN) TO NEXT FENCE
EXTERIOR FENCE

PERIMETER SECURITY FENCES
DOUBLE FENCE SYSTEM


SECURE SIDE
INTER-FENCE SPACE
TWO COILS OF BARBED TAPE CONCERTINA, SECURED TO STRANDS OF BARBED WIRE AND POSTS/ARMS WITH WIRE AS SHOWN AT 900 mm INTERVALS ALONG ENTIRE LENGTH OF PERIMETER FENCE EXTENDED TO 12 000 mm
TOP RAIL
4200
PERIMETER FENCE POSTS DESIGNED TO MEET ICE, WIND AND STORM CONDITIONS
3 STRANDS OF BARBED WIRE NO. 12 GA. GALV. 1200 mm HIGH
NO. 6 GA. 38 mm GALV. WIRE MESH WIRE TIES NO. 9 GA. GALV. AT 300 mm O.C. WRAP BOTTOM END OF WIRE MESH AROUND BOTTOM RAIL AND CLAMP ENDS
BOTTOM RAIL
GRADE
NOTE:
PERIMETER INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEMS (P.I.D.S.) WILL REQUIRE MODIFICATIONS TO BARBED TAPE CONCERTINA, TO SUIT SPECIFIC P.I.D.S. REQUIREMENTS
200 THICK x 900 DEEP SOLID CONCRETE BARRIER WITH CONTROL JOINTS AT POSTS

INTERIOR FENCE